yi-john-huang

Openclaw Secure Stack โ€” Development skill for Claude Code

Development community

๐Ÿ”’ One-command secure OpenClaw deployment with built-in skills scanner and prompt injection protection.

How to install Openclaw Secure Stack

This entry records only its repository, not the path inside it, so there is no exact command to give. Open yi-john-huang/openclaw-secure-stack and copy the folder into ~/.claude/skills/, or the file into ~/.claude/agents/.

What Openclaw Secure Stack does

๐Ÿ”’ One-command secure OpenClaw deployment with built-in skills scanner and prompt injection protection.

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README

OpenClaw Secure Stack

**Version 1.1.0** | [Changelog](CHANGELOG.md)

A hardened deployment wrapper that makes OpenClaw safe to self-host. Wraps an unmodified OpenClaw instance with authentication, skill scanning, prompt injection mitigation, pre-execution governance, webhook integrations, network isolation, and full audit logging โ€” without changing a single line of OpenClaw code.

Why This Exists

OpenClaw is a powerful AI agent that can install and run third-party "skills" (JavaScript/TypeScript plugins). Running it on your infrastructure introduces real risks:

Risk What could happen How we stop it
Malicious skills A skill runs dynamic code, spawns child processes, or exfiltrates data AST-based scanner detects dangerous patterns before skills execute
Prompt injection User input tricks the LLM into ignoring instructions Regex sanitizer strips or rejects known injection patterns
Indirect injection Tool results contain hidden instructions that hijack the agent Plugin hook scans tool output before it enters agent context
Unauthorized access Anyone on the network can use your OpenClaw instance Bearer token auth on every request (constant-time comparison)
Data exfiltration Skills phone home to attacker-controlled servers DNS allowlisting blocks outbound traffic to non-approved domains
Uncontrolled tool execution LLM executes dangerous tools without approval Pre-execution governance with policy validation and human-in-the-loop approval
Webhook abuse Attackers flood or spoof Telegram/WhatsApp endpoints HMAC signature verification, replay protection, rate limiting, body-size limits
No audit trail You can't tell what happened or when Every security event logged to append-only JSON Lines

Architecture

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