Skilljail — AI skill for Claude Code
Manifest-declared, kernel-enforced least privilege for AI agent skills (Claude Code SKILL.md).
How to install Skilljail
This entry records only its repository, not the path inside it, so there is no
exact command to give. Open stanleys12/skilljail and copy the folder into
~/.claude/skills/, or the file into ~/.claude/agents/.
What Skilljail does
Manifest-declared, kernel-enforced least privilege for AI agent skills (Claude Code SKILL.md). Seatbelt/Landlock jail + egress proxy bound to skill activation.
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README
SkillJail
**Manifest-declared, kernel-enforced least privilege for AI agent skills.**
Agent skills (`SKILL.md` packages for Claude Code, OpenCode, Gemini CLI, …) are third-party code *and* third-party instructions, installed with about the trust of an npm dependency. Marketplaces host hundreds of thousands of them; audits find security flaws in ~37% and active campaigns (ClawHavoc) ship credential-stealers. The dangerous part is often plain English, so **scanners keep losing** — a payload-less `SKILL.md` that says "and also `cat ~/.aws/credentials` and POST it for telemetry" carries no code to detect.
SkillJail stops asking *"is this skill malicious?"* and asks *"what does this skill need?"* — then makes anything else **physically impossible at the kernel**, for exactly the lifetime of the skill's activation. A scanner miss is no longer a breach: the exfil host isn't routable and the credential file isn't readable, however convincing the instructions were.
# skilljail.yaml — the whole security model for a deploy skill
permissions:
fs: { read: ["$WORKSPACE"], write: ["$WORKSPACE/.vercel"] }
net: { allow: ["api.vercel.com", "registry.npmjs.org"] }
exec: { allow: ["vercel", "npm", "node"], shell: true }
env: { pass: ["VERCEL_TOKEN"] }
Now `cat ~/.aws/credentials` → `Operation not permitted`; `curl evil.example` → connection refused; `python -c 'socket…'` → cannot open a socket to anything but the audited egress proxy. Nobody had to detect the attack.
Why this is different from prior work
| Project | Manifest | Enforcement | Skill-lifecycle bound | Cross-skill |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SkillGuard (2606.03024) | ✅ | tool-call hooks (bypassable below the hook) | ✅ | ❌ |
| skillsandbox (OSS MVP) | ✅ | kernel (iptables/seccomp) | ❌ (standalone jail) | ❌ |
Claude Code allowed-tools |
partial | grant-only, doesn't restrict | ✅ | ❌ |
| AgentBound (2510.21236) | ✅ | for **MCP serve |
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