AgentInjectionBench — Development skill for Claude Code
A benchmark for evaluating prompt injection attacks in agentic tool-use pipelines.
How to install AgentInjectionBench
This entry records only its repository, not the path inside it, so there is no
exact command to give. Open ppradyoth/AgentInjectionBench and copy the folder into
~/.claude/skills/, or the file into ~/.claude/agents/.
What AgentInjectionBench does
A benchmark for evaluating prompt injection attacks in agentic tool-use pipelines.
Alternatives in Development
- Bypass 403 — Probe a 403/401 endpoint with the most-paid bypass tricks (header injection, path encoding, method swap, WAF f 4.5k ★
- Claude Supermemory — Persistent memory across sessions and projects using Supermemory 2.3k ★
- Evo — turns your codebase into an autoresearch loop — discovers what to measure, instruments the benchmark, then run 1.4k ★
README
language:
- en license: apache-2.0 task_categories:
- text-classification
- text-generation tags:
- prompt-injection
- red-teaming
- ai-safety
- agentic-ai
- tool-use
- mcp
- benchmark
- security size_categories:
- 1K<n<10K
🔬 AgentInjectionBench
**A benchmark for evaluating prompt injection attacks in agentic tool-use pipelines.**
[](https://opensource.org/licenses/Apache-2.0) [](https://huggingface.co/datasets/ppradyoth/AgentInjectionBench) [](https://huggingface.co/spaces/ppradyoth/AgentInjectionBench)
Why AgentInjectionBench?
Existing prompt injection benchmarks (AdvBench, HarmBench, JailbreakBench) focus on **single-turn, user-side attacks** with binary harmful/benign labels. But modern AI systems are **agentic** — they call tools, query APIs, read files, and operate in multi-step workflows where the attack surface is radically different.
AgentInjectionBench is the **first benchmark specifically designed for injection attacks in agentic tool-use contexts**, covering:
| Attack Category | What it tests |
|---|---|
| Tool Output Injection | Malicious instructions embedded in API/tool responses |
| Goal Hijacking | Redirecting agent goals mid-workflow via poisoned content |
| Privilege Escalation | Tricking agents into unauthorized tool use |
| Data Exfiltration | Extracting system prompts, user data, or context |
| Multi-Turn Stateful | Attacks that build trust across multiple turns |
| MCP Context Poisoning | Poisoning MCP server responses to corrupt agent behavior |
Key Differentiators
- Agentic context: Every attack targets tool-calling, not direct user prompts
- Intent taxonomy: Labels go beyond harmful/benign — we classify attacker intent (exfiltration, hijacking, manipulation, escalation, denial, reconnaissance)
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