mdayan8

Model Intent Protocol — Data skill for Claude Code

Data community

MIP: a verified layer on top of MCP that only lets data reach destinations the user named.

How to install Model Intent Protocol

This entry records only its repository, not the path inside it, so there is no exact command to give. Open mdayan8/model-intent-protocol and copy the folder into ~/.claude/skills/, or the file into ~/.claude/agents/.

What Model Intent Protocol does

MIP: a verified layer on top of MCP that only lets data reach destinations the user named. Benchmarked on AgentDojo and MCPMark.

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README

MIP: Model Intent Protocol

MCP tells the model what it can do. MIP makes sure it only does what you meant.

MIP is a layer that sits on top of [MCP](https://modelcontextprotocol.io). Your agent and your MCP servers stay as they are. Every tool call that would send data somewhere passes through a small kernel first. The kernel allows the call only if the destination was named by the user, so a prompt injection cannot redirect your data to an attacker. The kernel is proven in Lean, ported to Rust, and the two agree on 2,000,000 random cases.

**Status: research prototype.** Everything below is measured and reproducible from this repo, including the parts where MIP does worse than plain tool calling.

Results at a glance

What was measured Classic tool calling MIP Where
Tool-definition tokens for 10 popular MCP servers (132 tools) 31,944 81 typical, 147 worst case tokens
Tool-definition tokens through the gateway, 4 real servers (40 tools) 4,539 533 gateway
Data-theft attacks that succeed when the model is fully hijacked (488 AgentDojo cases) 466 (95.5%) 6 (1.2%) hijacked agent
AgentDojo tasks completed, no attack (97 tasks, Claude Haiku 5.5) 80.4% 69.1% (Fence, directory) AgentDojo
AgentDojo attacks that succeeded, real model (949 cases) 1.9% 1.9% AgentDojo
MCPMark filesystem runs passed (40 tasks × 3 trials) 71.7% 66.7%, within noise MCPMark
MCPMark cost for the 120 runs $6.13 $3.01 MCPMark
Gateway latency added per tool call (median) 0.31 ms read, 0.55 ms write gateway
Kernel decision time (Rust, Apple M2) 0.21 to 1.02 µs [kernel](#6-the-kernel-proofs-and-differential-