gitayg

Moorai — AI skill for Claude Code

AI community

On-device guardrails for AI coding agents.

How to install Moorai

This entry records only its repository, not the path inside it, so there is no exact command to give. Open gitayg/moorai and copy the folder into ~/.claude/skills/, or the file into ~/.claude/agents/.

What Moorai does

On-device guardrails for AI coding agents. Hooks check prompts, file reads, shell commands, writes, web fetches and MCP calls before they run and scan tool output after. Validated end to end on Claude Code; Codex CLI, Copilot CLI, Cursor and Gemini CLI adapters tested on fixtures. Stdio MCP proxy for hosts without hooks. MIT.

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README

MoorAI

On-device guardrails for AI coding agents. Your prompts and files stay on the machine.

[![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-3ecf8e.svg)](LICENSE) [![Platform](https://img.shields.io/badge/platform-macOS%20%7C%20Windows%20%7C%20Linux-e4e4ef.svg)](#install) [![Build: Windows](https://github.com/gitayg/moorai/actions/workflows/release-windows.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/gitayg/moorai/actions)

**MoorAI reviews what your developers send to AI coding agents — and what those agents read, run, and reply — right on the device, before anything is exposed.** Secrets, PII, and source code never leave the machine to be checked. Your security team sees content-free signals, never the prompts.

Let your engineers use AI freely. Keep your data in-house.


The problem

Your developers use Claude Code, Cursor, and Copilot. Those agents don't just read what's typed — they **read files into context** (a stray `.env`), **call MCP tools** with whatever arguments they were given, and **reply** with whatever the model generates. Prompt review alone misses most of it, and every cloud DLP tool solves it by **sending your prompts to their servers to inspect**.

That's the exact trade MoorAI refuses.

What it does

  • Context interception — stops a secret or PII being read into the agent's context (e.g. an agent slurping a .env), not just typed in a prompt. Via the agent's PreToolUse hooks, on-device. An enrolled device enforces the policy (block, or hold for sign-off); a device that isn't enrolled coaches: the agent is told what it touched and the read goes ahead. What comes back into the agent — command output, MCP results, sub-agent reports, fetched pages — is scanned after the tool runs as untrusted inbound content.
  • Agency Enforcement — bounds what an agent is allowed to do: inspects mcp__* tool-call arguments for secrets/policy violations and blocks them, and enforces an approved-MCP-serve