Adversarial Audit Engine

[](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21288401) [](https://github.com/eddo-cto/adversarial-audit-engine/actions/workflows/tests.yml)

Adversarial Audit Engine

Audits a document or technical artifact by trying to **falsify** it: blind adversarial review across **different model vendors**, a deterministic grounding gate that blocks any finding not backed by a verbatim quote, explicit control of the falsifier's own **Type-I error**, and a code-enforced closure discipline. A hive of adversarial roles attacks the artifact; a dependency-free Python core enforces the rules. It never reports "validated" on internal grounds: **only a human validates.**

**[Read the story — how it was built and hardened across many adversarial rounds](STORY.md)**

**Status: stable (v1.1.0).** A tool that *multiplies* a competent human reviewer — it does not replace one, and it is not an oracle. The public API and the trust-protocol invariants are frozen for 1.x (**[`API.md`](plugins/adversarial-audit-engine/API.md)**). Tested across many adversarial self-audit rounds and on real cases (a consensus protocol, incident RCA, threat modeling, multi-regulation conflicts, scientific peer review), with the auditor's own Type-I error calibrated on a control battery.

What is enforced in code (the trust protocol)

The value is not detection accuracy; it is that the discipline lives in **ordinary Python**, each rule pinned by a test, so it behaves identically every run and cannot be talked out of by a prompt:

• Non-closure is cryptographic. VALIDATED requires a valid HMAC of the ledger digest under a key the operator holds outside the model's reach (aae/attestation.py); the model authors the payload but not the key, so it cannot sign its own validation.
• Independence is attested, not claimed. Cross-vendor review